It has become fashionable in some circles after September 11 to excoriate Jihaad as the source of the problems facing the Islamic world. The air is thick with theories which claim that Islam has been paralyzed by a deadening obscurantism since the twelfth century, and this paralysis will only end when Muslims decide to replace Islam with secular humanism. It is time these theories were deconstructed.<img src="http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/discussion/images/smilies/12.gif" border="0" alt="" title="Hurt" class="inlineimg" /> <br />
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I will turn directly to the thesis of the early demise of Islamic civilization: since the castigation of Islam often hinges on how and when this happened.<br />
First, and this is very important, this thesis is quite wrong about the timing of the decline. It claims that Islam lost its creative power in the twelfth century as a result of the twin blows dealt by orthodox 'Ulama-the religious scholars of Islam-and the Mongols. These ideas have an Orientalist odor.<br />
This canard was first challenged by Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974). He believes that the brilliant works, in architecture, philosophy, and the visual arts, created during the sixteenth century-in Isphahan, Istanbul, Delhi and Agra-were not inferior to the masterpieces of the Italian Renaissance.<br />
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The scientific work did not face sudden death either. In fact, George Saliba, in A History of Arabic Astronomy, extends Islam's golden age to the fifteenth century. After the Mongols are supposed to have devastated Eastern Islam, major observatories were being set up as late as the fifteenth century. The astronomical tables computed at these observatories, together with the work of Ibn-Shatir (d. 1375), a time-keeper in the central mosque of Damascus, were passed on to Europe, and are believed to have contributed to the Copernican revolution. <br />
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If Islam did not suffer a decline in the twelfth century, when did this happen? The beginnings of this process, as well as its sources, must be sought not so much in Islam as in Europe. It wasn't Islam that stumbled. Rather, it was Europe that gathered speed and moved ahead, in gunnery and shipping, starting in the sixteenth century. <br />
<br />
Europe employed its maritime strength to plunder the gold and silver of the Americas, create an Atlantic economy, and dominate the commerce of the Indian Ocean. This deepened Europe's commercial and financial capital, while squeezing the trading profits of the major Islamic empires as well as the smaller trading states in the Indian Ocean. Over time, Europe' military advantage became decisive. And by the beginning of the nineteenth century?in India even before thatéÂÂÂÂ絬rope started its project of dismantling the Islamic polities in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.Why couldn't Islamic-or other-polities resist this growing European thrust? The Eurocentric narratives would have us believe that this was fait accompli: the simple working out of Europe's racial, geographic, climatic, and cultural advantages over others. Asia and Africa could have done little to resist.<br />
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A new 'cold war' had descended on the Islamic world in the 1990s. Its rules were clear. The United States would support the Islamic despots-of whatever stripe-so long as they kept the lid on political Islam. If any country dared to depart from the terms of this contract, it faced economic and military sanctions; and, if these did not work, they would be followed by swift and devastating reprisals. Iraq showed to the Islamic world the price it would pay for challenging this new contract. Similarly, Algeria stands as an example of what happens when the democratic process threatens to empower Islamists.<br />
<br />
Those who believe that Islam is anti-democratic need a short lesson in the modern history of constitutional movements in Islam. Muhammad Ali of Egypt appointed his first advisory council in 1824, consisting mostly of elected members. In 1881, the Egyptian nationalist movement succeeded in convening an elected parliament, but this was aborted only a year later by British occupation. Tunisia had promulgated a constitution in 1860, setting up a Supreme Council purporting to limit the powers of the monarchy. But this was suspended in 1864 when the French discovered that it interfered with their ambitions. Turkey elected its first parliament in 1877, though it was dissolved a year later by the Caliph; a second parliament was convened in 1908. Iran's progress was more dramatic. It started with protests against a British tobacco monopoly in the 1890s, and quickly led to an elected parliament in 1906, with powers to confirm the cabinet. A year later, however, the British and Russians carved up Iran into their spheres of influence, a development that would lead to the dissolution of the parliament in 1910. Nevertheless, the constitutional movement persisted until it was suppressed in 1931 by a new dynasty brought to power by the British.<br />
<br />
Compare these developments with the history of constitutional movements elsewhere, not excluding Europe, during the nineteenth century-and the world of Islam does not suffer from the comparison. Incredible as this appears to minds blinded by Eurocentric prejudice, Tunisia, Egypt and Iran were taking the lead in making the transition to constitutional monarchies. The 'resistance to democracy' in the Arab world even today does not come from their population. Quite the opposite. It comes from neo-colonial surrogates-brutal military dictatorships and absolutist monarchies-imposed by a United States determined to safeguard oil and Israel.<img src="http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/discussion/images/smilies/39.gif" border="0" alt="" title="Thinking" class="inlineimg" />
<br />
I will turn directly to the thesis of the early demise of Islamic civilization: since the castigation of Islam often hinges on how and when this happened.<br />
First, and this is very important, this thesis is quite wrong about the timing of the decline. It claims that Islam lost its creative power in the twelfth century as a result of the twin blows dealt by orthodox 'Ulama-the religious scholars of Islam-and the Mongols. These ideas have an Orientalist odor.<br />
This canard was first challenged by Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (1974). He believes that the brilliant works, in architecture, philosophy, and the visual arts, created during the sixteenth century-in Isphahan, Istanbul, Delhi and Agra-were not inferior to the masterpieces of the Italian Renaissance.<br />
<br />
The scientific work did not face sudden death either. In fact, George Saliba, in A History of Arabic Astronomy, extends Islam's golden age to the fifteenth century. After the Mongols are supposed to have devastated Eastern Islam, major observatories were being set up as late as the fifteenth century. The astronomical tables computed at these observatories, together with the work of Ibn-Shatir (d. 1375), a time-keeper in the central mosque of Damascus, were passed on to Europe, and are believed to have contributed to the Copernican revolution. <br />
<br />
If Islam did not suffer a decline in the twelfth century, when did this happen? The beginnings of this process, as well as its sources, must be sought not so much in Islam as in Europe. It wasn't Islam that stumbled. Rather, it was Europe that gathered speed and moved ahead, in gunnery and shipping, starting in the sixteenth century. <br />
<br />
Europe employed its maritime strength to plunder the gold and silver of the Americas, create an Atlantic economy, and dominate the commerce of the Indian Ocean. This deepened Europe's commercial and financial capital, while squeezing the trading profits of the major Islamic empires as well as the smaller trading states in the Indian Ocean. Over time, Europe' military advantage became decisive. And by the beginning of the nineteenth century?in India even before thatéÂÂÂÂ絬rope started its project of dismantling the Islamic polities in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.Why couldn't Islamic-or other-polities resist this growing European thrust? The Eurocentric narratives would have us believe that this was fait accompli: the simple working out of Europe's racial, geographic, climatic, and cultural advantages over others. Asia and Africa could have done little to resist.<br />
<br />
A new 'cold war' had descended on the Islamic world in the 1990s. Its rules were clear. The United States would support the Islamic despots-of whatever stripe-so long as they kept the lid on political Islam. If any country dared to depart from the terms of this contract, it faced economic and military sanctions; and, if these did not work, they would be followed by swift and devastating reprisals. Iraq showed to the Islamic world the price it would pay for challenging this new contract. Similarly, Algeria stands as an example of what happens when the democratic process threatens to empower Islamists.<br />
<br />
Those who believe that Islam is anti-democratic need a short lesson in the modern history of constitutional movements in Islam. Muhammad Ali of Egypt appointed his first advisory council in 1824, consisting mostly of elected members. In 1881, the Egyptian nationalist movement succeeded in convening an elected parliament, but this was aborted only a year later by British occupation. Tunisia had promulgated a constitution in 1860, setting up a Supreme Council purporting to limit the powers of the monarchy. But this was suspended in 1864 when the French discovered that it interfered with their ambitions. Turkey elected its first parliament in 1877, though it was dissolved a year later by the Caliph; a second parliament was convened in 1908. Iran's progress was more dramatic. It started with protests against a British tobacco monopoly in the 1890s, and quickly led to an elected parliament in 1906, with powers to confirm the cabinet. A year later, however, the British and Russians carved up Iran into their spheres of influence, a development that would lead to the dissolution of the parliament in 1910. Nevertheless, the constitutional movement persisted until it was suppressed in 1931 by a new dynasty brought to power by the British.<br />
<br />
Compare these developments with the history of constitutional movements elsewhere, not excluding Europe, during the nineteenth century-and the world of Islam does not suffer from the comparison. Incredible as this appears to minds blinded by Eurocentric prejudice, Tunisia, Egypt and Iran were taking the lead in making the transition to constitutional monarchies. The 'resistance to democracy' in the Arab world even today does not come from their population. Quite the opposite. It comes from neo-colonial surrogates-brutal military dictatorships and absolutist monarchies-imposed by a United States determined to safeguard oil and Israel.<img src="http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/discussion/images/smilies/39.gif" border="0" alt="" title="Thinking" class="inlineimg" />